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I. INTRODUCTION 
When Congress enacted § 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”)1 it changed 
the landscape of defamation law on the Internet.  In the eleven years since Congress passed § 
230, courts have interpreted it broadly, giving seemingly complete immunity to internet service 
providers (“ISPs”) and website operators in third-party claims for defamation committed on the 
Internet.2  This essay argues that today, with the Internet being the dominant medium that it is, 
the CDA is outdated and unfair, and should be amended or repealed in favor of the common law 
framework for publisher liability in defamation.3 
Part II of this essay tracks the development of defamation law on the Internet.4  First, it 
describes the common law framework for liability for publishers in defamation claims.5  Second, 
it will discuss the two landmark pre-CDA cases that pushed Congress to enact the legislation.6  
Third, it will describe the enactment of the CDA and its legal effect.7  Lastly, Part II will discuss 
the post-CDA cases and will exhibit how courts have interpreted the CDA.8  Part III will 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, expected 2008, University of Maryland School of Law. 
1 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000). 
2 See infra Part II.D. 
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summarize the current state of defamation law on the Internet, given how courts have interpreted 
the CDA.9   
Finally, Part IV will suggest a new approach to publisher liability for defamation on the 
Internet.10  In particular, this essay advocates that defamation liability for ISPs should be based 
on the common law framework.11  This approach would make liability based on the amount of 
control the ISP has over the particular defamatory material.12  Additionally, this essay articulates 
why two of Congress’s main reasons for enacting § 230 are seriously flawed.  First, Congress 
thought notice-based liability would remove incentives for ISPs to self-regulate, but this essay 
argues that a) as it stands today, there currently is no incentive to self-regulate, and b) if courts 
impose a reasonable ISP standard, those entities would be unable to avoid liability by simply 
turning a cold shoulder to potential defamation.13  Second, Congress believed that the fear of 
potential liability would force ISPs to simply remove any possibly defamatory content.  This 
concern is flawed because a) it fails to take into account the fact that some speech – namely, 
defamatory speech – should be regulated, and b) market forces and online word of mouth will 
preclude companies from screening too freely.14 
Such an approach would continue to take into account Congress’s concerns about ISPs 
having to police an enormous amount of material, but would also take into account society’s 
interest in redressing individuals who are defamed through the Internet.  Further, there is little 
reason to continue to grant such broad immunity to ISPs given that one of Congress’s purposes 
                                                 
9 See infra Part III. 
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11 See infra Part IV.A. 
12 See infra Part IV.B. 
13 See infra notes 167–171 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 171–182 and accompanying text. 
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when enacting the CDA in 1996 was to promote the development of the Internet, and the Internet 
has grown immensely since that time.15 
 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEFAMATION LAW ON THE INTERNET 
Defamation law as it relates to the Internet has changed significantly in the last fifteen 
years.  In the beginning, there was a framework at common law for publisher liability for 
defamation based on the amount of control over the material the publisher had.16  The early cases 
– Cubby and Stratton Oakmont – involving defamation claims against ISPs for publisher liability 
used this framework in assessing liability.17  In 1996, though, Congress enacted the CDA, which 
drastically changed the state of the law in Internet defamation.18  In post-CDA cases, courts have 
broadly interpreted the CDA’s immunity, even when they do not agree with Congress’s policy 
choice.19 
 
A. Common Law Framework 
At common law, liability for an entity that published or distributed defamatory material is 
based on a three-part framework.  An entity is classified as either a publisher, distributor, or 
common carrier depending on the amount of control it retains over the defamatory material.20 
The least culpable of the three classifications is a common carrier.  A common carrier has 
no editorial control over the information it carries, such as a telephone company, which has no 
                                                 
15 See infra Part IV.C. 
16 See infra Part II.A. 
17 See infra Part II.B. 
18 See infra Part II.C. 
19 See infra Part II.D. 
20 Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Liability of Internet Service Provider for Internet or E-mail 
Defamation, 84 A.L.R. 5TH 169, § 2[a] (2000). 
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control over the content of the calls that pass through it.21  Given a common carrier’s lack of 
editorial control and lack of awareness as to what it is carrying, this “passive conduit” is not 
liable for the information it transmits from one party to another.22 
On the other end of the liability spectrum – and, likewise, the control spectrum – is a 
publisher.  An entity classified as a publisher is one that retains substantial editorial control over 
the information it sends out, such as a newspaper.23  A newspaper, for example, actively selects 
what content it will publish and thus should have great ability to notice potentially defamatory 
material.  Since the entity has this amount of control, it is liable under normal defamation 
standards and can be liable if the claimant shows at least negligence on the publisher’s part.24 
Falling in the middle of the liability spectrum are the entities classified as distributors.  
Entities falling into this category are often compared to public libraries or bookstores because 
they have a choice as to what information to carry and thus are not passive conduits like 
telephone companies, but they do not retain editorial control over the material to the same extent 
that a newspaper does.25  To hold a distributor liable a plaintiff must show that the material was 
defamatory and that the distributor knew or should have reasonably known of the defamatory 
nature of the work.26 








Thus, the common law framework, which is divided into three categories – common 
carriers, publishers, and distributors – assesses liability based on the amount of editorial control 
the entity retains over the defamatory material.27 
 
B. The Pre-CDA Cases: Cubby and Stratton Oakmont 
There are two seminal cases decided before Congress enacted the CDA in which courts 
applied the common law publisher liability framework to ISPs: Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc.28 
and Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.29 
 
1. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc. 
In Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., Cubby, Inc. and Robert Blanchard developed a 
computer database, “Skuttlebut,” through which they published news and gossip relating to the 
television and radio industries.30  Cubby and Blanchard intended Skuttlebut to compete with 
“Rumorville,” a similar gossip publication that CompuServe provided to its subscribers through 
its forums.31  Cubby and Blanchard brought suit against CompuServe, alleging that, as a result of 
this possible competition, Rumorville published false and defamatory statements about 
Skuttlebut and Blanchard, and CompuServe carried the statements as part of its forum.32  
                                                 
27 Barry J. Waldman, Comment, A Unified Approach to Cyber-Libel: Defamation on the 
Internet, A Suggested Approach, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, 33 (1999).  
28 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
29 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). 
30 776 F. Supp. at 138. 
31 Id. at 137–38. 
32 Id. at 138 (“[T]he allegedly defamatory remarks included a suggestion that individuals at 
Skuttlebut gained access to information first published by Rumorville ‘through some back door’; 
a statement that Blanchard was ‘bounced’ from his previous employer, WABC; and a description 
of Skuttlebut as a ‘new start-up scam.’”). 
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CompuServe moved for summary judgment.33  CompuServe argued that “it acted as a 
distributor, and not a publisher, of the statements, and cannot be held liable for the statements 
because it did not know and had no reason to know of the statements.”34 
The District Court for the Southern District of New York began its analysis by noting 
that, with respect to entities such as book stores and libraries, these distributors will not be liable 
if they do not know or have no reason to know of the defamatory content.35  The court stated that 
CompuServe in essence ran an electronic for-profit library since it charged subscribers usage 
fees to view the publications it carried.36  The court pointed out that CompuServe could decline 
to carry a given publication, but once it decided to carry one it had little or no control over the 
publication’s contents.37 
The court held that the appropriate standard of liability for an entity such as CompuServe 
is “whether it knew or had reason to know of the allegedly defamatory . . . statements.”38  In 
coming to this conclusion, the court reasoned that it was infeasible for CompuServe to examine 
every publication it carries for possibly defamatory statements, so a knowledge-based approach, 
like that used in the common law framework for entities classified as distributors, was the best 
option for liability.39  Ultimately, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to set forth any facts 
showing that CompuServe knew or should have known of the Rumorville statements.40  Thus, 
                                                 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 139 (citing Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981)). 
36 Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 140. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 140–41. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 141. 
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because CompuServe, as a distributor, may not be liable if it did not know or should not have 
known of the statements, the court granted its motion for summary judgment.41 
 
2. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co. 
In Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., the underlying allegedly defamatory 
statements were made on one of Prodigy’s bulletin boards.42  “Money Talks,” the board on 
which the statements appeared, was at that time the most widely read financial bulletin board in 
the United States.43  Prodigy members could post on Money Talks statements about stocks, 
investments and any other financial matters.44 
As part of its evidence that Prodigy was a publisher, the plaintiffs argued that Prodigy 
held itself out as a service that exercised editorial control over the content posted on its bulletin 
boards.45  Prodigy argued that its policies were different and that it did not retain such control.46  
The court stated that the critical issue to determine was whether Prodigy “exercised sufficient 
editorial control . . . to render it a publisher with the same responsibilities as a newspaper.”47 
The court reviewed Cubby and found two key distinctions.48  “First, [Prodigy] held itself 
out to the public and its members as controlling the content of its computer bulletin boards.”49  
Second, Prodigy implemented this control through a screening program and its own guidelines, 
                                                 
41 Id. 
42 1995 WL 323710, at *1. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at *2. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at *3. 
48 Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *4. 
49 Id. 
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which it was required to follow.50  The court held that Prodigy made decisions regarding content 
because it actively deleted notes from its bulletin boards on the basis of their content.51  Thus, 
the court concluded that Prodigy was a publisher rather than a distributor.52 
 
                                                
The court further clarified that it agreed with the Cubby court that computer bulletin 
boards should generally be treated like bookstores and libraries, but it was Prodigy’s own 
policies and choice to exert editorial control that altered the scenario and made them a publisher 
in this context.53  Prodigy’s choice to exercise editorial control, according to the court, “opened 
it up to a greater liability than . . . other computer networks that make no such choice.”54
 
C. § 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
After Cubby and Stratton, Congress enacted § 230 of the Communications Decency Act.  
In fact, Congress enacted § 230 in large part as a response to those earlier decisions.  Subsection 
(a) of the CDA contains Congress’s findings; notably, that the Internet and other computer 
services represent an “extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and informational 
resources,” and that the Internet offers a forum for diversity of political discourse and 
opportunity for cultural development.55  Furthermore, Congress found that the Internet will 
flourish to the benefit of all Americans with minimal government regulation.56 
In subsection (b), Congress made it clear that its policy was to “promote the continued 





53 Id. at *5. 
54 Id.  The court foresaw what might occur in the future, stating that the issues it addressed may 
soon be preempted by the then-pending CDA if Congress passed it.  Id. 
55 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1),(3) (2000). 
56 Id. § 230(a)(4). 
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and competitive free market . . . for the Internet and other interactive computer services, 
unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”57  Section 230 also states that its policy is “to 
encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over what information 
is received by individuals, families, and schools” and “remove disincentives for . . . blocking and 
filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or 
inappropriate online material.”58 
Subsection (c) of the CDA, known as the “Good Samaritan” provision, states that “[n]o 
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by another information content provider.”59  It also states that no 
provider of an interactive computer service shall be liable for any action that is taken voluntarily 
and in good faith to restrict access to inappropriate material, whether or not such material is 
constitutionally protected.60 
Subsection (e) explicitly preempts state law, stating that no claim may be made under 
state law that is inconsistent with § 230.61 
Lastly, subsection (f) provides definitions for the CDA.  It provides that the term 
“interactive computer service,” as it is used in the CDA, means “any information service, system, 
or access software provider that provides or enables computer access . . . to a computer server.”62  
The term “information content provider” refers to “any person or entity that is responsible . . . for 
                                                 
57 Id. § 230(b)(1)-(2). 
58 Id. § 230(b)(3)-(4). 
59 Id. § 230(c)(1). 
60 Id. § 230(c)(2)(A).   
61 Id. § 230(e)(3). 
62 Id. § 230(f)(2). 
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the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive 
computer service.”63 
It has been said that “[o]ne of the specific purposes of [§ 230] was to overrule [Stratton 
Oakmont] and any other similar decisions which have treated such providers and users as 
publishers or speakers of content that is not their own because they have restricted access to 
objectionable material.”64  Indeed, § 230 precludes claims placing ISPs in a publisher’s role; 
thus, ISPs cannot be liable for their exercise of traditional editorial functions, “such as deciding 
whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter content.”65 
 
D. Post-CDA Cases 
Following Congress’s enactment of § 230 of the CDA, courts interpreted the Act’s 
immunity very broadly.  Starting with the landmark post-CDA case, Zeran v. America Online, 
Inc.,66 the cases following §230’s enactment show how it drastically changed the legal landscape 
of defamation on the Internet.67 
 
1. Zeran v. America Online, Inc. 
In Zeran v. America Online, Inc., an unidentified person posted a message on an America 
Online (“AOL”) bulletin board advertising t-shirts containing tasteless slogans relating to the 
1995 Oklahoma City bombing.68  The anonymous poster told anyone interested in purchasing a 
                                                 
63 Id. § 230(f)(3). 
64 NTS AM. JUR. 2D. Computers and the Internet § 62 (2006). 
65 Id. § 63. 
66 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
67 See infra notes 68–126 and accompanying text. 
68 129 F.3d at 329. 
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shirt to call “Ken” at Kenneth Zeran’s home phone number.69  As a result, Zeran received a high 
volume of angry phone calls, including death threats.70 
Zeran called AOL to complain about the problem and an AOL employee assured that 
AOL would remove the posting, but over the next few days the unidentified person continued 
posting similar messages.71  Within a few days the messages were being talked about on radio 
stations, and the situation finally ended when a local newspaper exposed that the shirt 
advertisements were a hoax.72 
Zeran filed suit against AOL seeking to hold it liable for the defamatory speech initiated 
by a third party, but posted through AOL’s service.73  The Fourth Circuit reviewed § 230, 
concluding that it barred lawsuits seeking to hold an ISP liable for its role as a publisher when it 
exercises functions “such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content.”74  
The court noted that Congress’s purpose in enacting § 230 was because ISPs have millions of 
users and it would be impossible for them to screen all of their postings.75  As a result, the court 
reasoned, ISPs might choose to restrict the number of messages posted, thus severely affecting 
speech.76 
The Zeran court then noted that Congress enacted § 230 as a response to Stratton 
Oakmont – to remove the disincentives to self-regulation created by that decision.77  Zeran 





73 Id. at 330. 
74 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 331. 
77 Id.  The court reasoned that since the finding of liability in Stratton Oakmont was based on 
Prodigy’s decision to actively screen messages, this created a disincentive for ISPs to exert 
similar control.  Id. 
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argued that § 230 was meant to eliminate only publisher liability and not distributor liability and, 
as such, ISPs could be still liable if they knew or should have known about defamatory messages 
posted through their service and did not remove them.78  The court rejected Zeran’s argument, 
reasoning that distributor liability was merely a subset of publisher liability, and both are 
precluded under § 230.79  The court acknowledged that a different standard of liability applies to 
publishers and distributors, but stated that the difference in liability applies only within the larger 
publisher umbrella.80 
In sum, the court noted, imposing liability on ISPs as distributors – a standard based on 
notice – would defeat the purposes advanced by § 230.81  The court feared that ISPs would have 
to rapidly investigate all messages they were notified about and make a legal judgment 
concerning whether it was defamatory.82  This might be feasible, the court noted, for a print 
publisher, but the large number of postings on the Internet would cause a substantial burden on 
an ISP.83 
 
2. Blumenthal v. Drudge 
After Zeran, the next big case involving § 230 was Blumenthal v. Drudge.84  In 
Blumenthal, Sidney Blumenthal, then an Assistant to the President of the United States, brought 
suit against AOL and Matt Drudge, who was the creator of an electronic gossip column called 
                                                 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 331–32. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 333. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998). 
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the “Drudge Report.”85  Drudge had entered into an agreement with AOL whereby AOL paid 
Drudge to have the rights to make the Drudge Report available to its members.86  Under the 
agreement, AOL had the right to remove any content from the Report that it determined violated 
its terms of service.87 
Drudge wrote a column about Blumenthal and sent it to AOL, who then made it available 
to its subscribers.88  The column accused Blumenthal of having a history of spousal abuse.89  
Blumenthal brought suit against Drudge claiming defamation and seeking to hold AOL liable as 
the publisher of the materials.90 
The court stated that Congress decided to treat ISPs differently than other providers such 
as newspapers or television stations, which can be held liable for publishing or distributing 
defamatory material prepared by others.91  The court pointed out that had AOL taken part in the 
creation or development in the story it could have been liable, but AOL played no such role 
there.92  Indeed, the court stated, AOL did nothing more than carry the report.93 
Blumenthal also argued that § 230 did not immunize AOL in this context because Drudge 
was not simply an anonymous person who sent a message; he was a person with whom AOL 
contracted and over whose work AOL retained the right to remove any content that violated its 
terms of service.94  Also, Blumenthal argued, AOL advertised Drudge’s column as a way of 
                                                 
85 Id. at 46–47. 
86 Id. at 47. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 47–48. 
89 Id. at 46. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 49. 
92 Id. at 50. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 51. 
 13
gaining new subscribers.95  Interestingly, the court expressly agreed with Blumenthal, stating 
that if given its own choice it would hold AOL accountable due to its relationship with Drudge
However, the court stated, it was required to follow § 230 and immunize AOL, even though it 
took advantage of the benefits of the CDA without accepting any of its burdens.
.96  
                                                
97 
 
3. Lunney v. Prodigy Services Co. 
In Lunney v. Prodigy Services Co., an unidentified person opened membership accounts 
with Prodigy under the plaintiff, Alexander Lunney’s, name.98  From those accounts the 
unidentified person sent emails to a local Boy Scout scoutmaster explaining how he was going to 
kill him.99  Prodigy eventually closed down the accounts; Lunney then sued Prodigy claiming 
that it was “derelict in allowing the accounts to be opened in his name, and was responsible for 
his having been stigmatized and defamed.”100 
 
95 Id. 
96 Id.  In an oft-quoted passage the court expressed its views about its decision were it not 
restrained by Congress’s enactment of § 230: 
Because it has the right to exercise editorial control over those with whom 
it contracts and whose words it disseminates, it would seem only fair to 
hold AOL to the liability standards applied to a publisher or, at least, like a 
book store owner or library, to the liability standards applied to a 
distributor.  But Congress has made a different policy choice by providing 
immunity even where the interactive service provider has an active, even 
aggressive role in making available content prepared by others.  In some 
sort of tacit quid pro quo arrangement with the service provider 
community, Congress has conferred immunity from tort liability as an 
incentive to Internet service providers to self-police the Internet for 
obscenity and other offensive material, even where the self-policing is 
unsuccessful or not even attempted. 
Id. at 51–52. 
97 Id. at 52–53. 
98 94 N.Y.2d 242, 246–47 (N.Y. 1999). 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 247. 
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The court analyzed the claims against Prodigy under New York common law, rather than 
§ 230.101  Regarding the emails and bulletin board messages involved in the case, the court 
compared the situation to the distinction between a telegraph company and a telephone 
company.102  Essentially, the court reasoned, a telegraph company knows the content of the 
messages it passes because its agents take part in the process, whereas a telephone company 
plays only a passive role.103  The court held that Prodigy was much more akin to a telephone 
company and that no one could expect it to monitor the content of its subscribers’ emails.  Thus, 
Prodigy was not a publisher in this instance.104 
 
4. Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and Co. v. America Online Inc. 
The online publication of incorrect stock quotes was at issue in Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and 
Co. v. America Online Inc.105  There, the plaintiff claimed that AOL – who contracted with third-
party companies that provided it stock information – had on three occasions published incorrect 
information concerning the plaintiff’s stock price and share volume.106  As a result, the plaintiff 
claimed, it was defamed.107  The plaintiff conceded that AOL was an “interactive computer 
service” under § 230, but argued that AOL worked so closely with the third party companies in 
the creation of the stock information as to make it an “information content provider” and 
therefore not immune under § 230.108 
                                                 
101 Id. at 248–49.  The events giving rise to the claims occurred before Congress enacted § 230 
and thus the court declined to give it retroactive effect.  Id. at 251. 
102 Id. at 249. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000). 
106 Id. at 983. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 985. 
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The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument, reasoning that while AOL communicated 
with the third party companies, it was not enough to “constitute the development or creation of 
the stock quotation information.”109  The plaintiff further argued that because AOL deleted some 
stock information, this transformed it into an “information content provider.”110  The court also 
rejected this argument, reasoning that AOL simply made the content unavailable and did not 
develop or create the content, and as such was “engaging in the editorial functions Congress 
sought to protect.”111 
 
5. Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc. 
In Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., an actress sued the creator/operator of 
Matchmaker.com (“Matchmaker”) for defamation resulting from the posting of false statements 
on a personal profile, which an unidentified person had opened in the plaintiff’s name.112  The 
plaintiff first argued that the defendant, a website operator, did not qualify for immunity under § 
230 because it was not an interactive service provider.113  The court quickly rejected this 
argument, stating that website operators do qualify as providers of an interactive computer 
service under § 230.114 
                                                 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 985–86. 
111 Id. at 986. 
112 207 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1059–61 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d, 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003).  The 
profile included the plaintiff’s home address, email address, and answers to questions 
characterizing her as licentious.  Carafano, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 1061. 
113 Id. at 1065. 
114 Id. at 1066.  As authority on this issue the court cited Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 
37, 39 (Wash Ct. App. 2001), and Stoner v. eBay, Inc., No. 305666, 2000 WL 1705637 (Cal. 
Super. 2000). 
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The Ninth Circuit went on to hold that Matchmaker qualified for immunity because it 
was not an information content provider.115  The court reasoned that just because Matchmaker 
provided the questions and the framework from which users create their profiles, this alone did 
not transform it into an information content provider.116  The court noted that the users had 
complete control over the selection of content to input into each profile, and that profiles have no 
content until a user creates it.117 
 
6. Batzel v. Smith 
In Batzel v. Smith, a handyman overheard a person on whose house he was working tell a 
friend that she was related to a former Nazi politician, and on another occasion the homeowner 
also told the handyman that she inherited some of the paintings hanging in her home.118  The 
handyman had a suspicion that these paintings were stolen during World War II and belonged to 
the Jewish people.119  He sent an email to the Museum Security Network (“MSN” or “Network”) 
website indicating his suspicions.120 
MSN’s operator reviewed the message and then published it to the Network listserv and 
posted it on the Network’s website after making some minor changes.121  The operator generally 
exercised some editorial discretion in choosing which received emails to post on the listserv and 
                                                 
115 Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1125.  The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court on this issue, which 
held that Matchmaker was an information content provider because it provided the questions for 
the profiles.  Carafano, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 1066. 
116 Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124. 
117 Id. 
118 333 F.3d 1018, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2003). 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 1021. 
121 Id. 
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website, omitting those that do not pertain to stolen art.122  After discovering the message, the 
homeowner sued the handyman and the MSN operator for defamation for implicating her in 
those activities.123 
After quickly finding the first requirement of § 230 – that the defendant seeking 
immunity qualify as an interactive computer service – met, the court focused on whether the 
MSN operator took part in the creation of the content due to his editorial role in publishing the 
message.124  The court held that the operator’s minor alterations of the message or his choice to 
publish it do not rise to the level of “development” under § 230.125  “[D]evelopment of 
information,” the court stated, “means something more substantial than merely editing portions 
of an e-mail and selecting material for publication.”126 
 
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF INTERNET DEFAMATION LAW 
The CDA has dramatically changed defamation law insofar as potential liability for 
Internet publishers and distributors of defamatory material is concerned.  Today, claims 
attempting to hold an ISP liable for defamation for engaging in traditional editorial functions, 
“such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content . . . are barred.”127  
This immunity, according to the courts that have interpreted the CDA, applies not only to entities 
that would be liable as a publisher of defamatory material, but also to those that would be liable 
                                                 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 1022. 
124 Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1030–31. 
125 Id. at 1031. 
126 Id. 
127 Zeran, v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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under a distributor liability theory.128  Thus, even if an ISP retains editorial control over what it 
publishes through the Internet and has knowledge of defamatory statements contained therein, it 
cannot be held liable under either theory.129 
Three elements are required for § 230 immunity to apply.130  First, the defendant must be 
a provider or user of an “interactive computer service.”131  At least two courts have interpreted 
the term “interactive service provider” to include website operators, in addition to Internet 
service providers such as America Online and Prodigy.132  Second, the claims must treat the 
defendant as a publisher or speaker of information.133  Lastly, the information must be provided 
by another “information content provider,” and not the ISP itself.134  An information content 
provider is any person or entity “that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or 
development of information provided through the Internet.”135 An ISP will not be liable if the 
defamatory material is provided solely by a third party, but if the ISP takes any part in the 
creation of the material it could be liable.  For example, a website operator was not a content 
provider of information and was immune under § 230 when it provided questions for users to 
answer when making a personal profile on its website.136 
                                                 
128 NTS AM. JUR. 2D Computers and the Internet § 77 (2006) (citing Zeran v. America Online, 
Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1124 (E.D. Va. 1997)). 
129 Id. 
130 Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 39 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). 
131 Id. 
132 See id. at 40–41 (finding Amazon, the operator of the website Amazon.com, to be a provider 
of interactive computer services under § 230); Carafano, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 1066 (operator of 
Matchmaker.com qualified for immunity under § 230). 
133 Id. at 39. 
134 Id. 
135 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2000). 
136 Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003).  
 19
In addition to providing federal immunity to defamation claims, the CDA expressly 
preempts all state law claims for this type of defamation against the entities protected under the 
CDA.137 
 
IV. A NEW APPROACH: REINSTATING THE COMMON LAW FRAMEWORK 
Congress should repeal the CDA because it has been interpreted too broadly and works a 
serious injustice on the victims of defamatory messages posted on the Internet.138  While 
immunity for ISPs and website operators makes sense in some circumstances,139 there should not 
be near-complete immunity for ISPs and website operators that have an editorial role in posting, 
or have knowledge of, defamatory material on the Internet.140  Rather, Congress should repeal 
the CDA and courts should apply the common law framework to Internet defamation cases 
attempting to hold an ISP or website operator liable under a publisher or distributor liability 
theory.141 
This approach would take into account how much control an ISP has over the content it 
provides, rather than simply granting blanket immunity to all ISPs.  As is discussed below, this 
approach would also address and resolve the two main concerns Congress had when it enacted § 
230: (1) that notice-based liability will disincentivize ISPs from self-regulating due to the fear of 
liability; and (2) that as a result of potential liability, ISPs will simply remove all questionable 
                                                 
137 § 230(e)(3). 
138 Cf. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr.3d, 155 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 51 Cal. Rptr.3d 55 
(Cal. 2006) (noting that the Zeran court granted a much more expansive immunity than was 
necessary). 
139 See infra notes 152–155 and accompanying text. 
140 See infra notes 156–158 and accompanying text. 
141 See infra Part IV.A. 
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content and “chill” online speech.142  Finally, this approach, unlike § 230, takes into account that 
a large number of defamation victims are unable to recover damages from the third-party content 
providers themselves due to their anonymity, and thus are totally barred from recovery due to the 
ISPs’ immunity.143 
When applying the common law framework courts should decide on a case-by-case basis 
what common law category a given ISP falls into based on its role and function in the particular 
case.144  Indeed, this approach is preferable because the immunity § 230 provides has been 
interpreted more broadly than Congress intended when it enacted § 230.145  Moreover, even if 
Congress intended to grant such broad immunity, its rationale carries much less weight today 
given the growth and prosperity of the Internet in the eleven years since Congress enacted § 
230.146 
 
A. Courts Should Apply the Common Law Framework 
The common law framework, which divides entities that disseminate third-parties’ 
material into publishers, distributors and common carriers,147 should be the standard not only for 
classic media such as newspaper and television but also for Internet entities.148  Instinctively, it 
seems appropriate to hold ISPs to the same standard of liability as non-Internet entities, but as 
                                                 
142 See infra notes 167–179 and accompanying text. 
143 See infra note 187 and accompanying text. 
144 See infra Part IV.B. 
145 See infra Part IV.C. 
146 See infra Part IV.C. 
147  See Zitter, 84 A.L.R. 5TH 169, § 2[a] (2000). 
148 See Jonathan A. Friedman & Francis M. Buono, Limiting Tort Liability for Online Third-
Party Content Under Section 230 of the Communications Act, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 647, 665 
(2000) (stating that in the event Congress decides to narrow § 230 immunity, the common carrier 
model is the best option). 
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long as the CDA is in force, a far different standard applies.149  That current standard affords 
near complete immunity to publishers or distributors of online defamation.  As a result, the issue 
of liability should be focused on how much control an ISP possesses over the allegedly 
defamatory material and not simply whether the entity is an ISP and is therefore immune on that 
basis alone.150 
Sometimes § 230 serves its intended purpose and properly immunizes ISPs.  This 
immunity works as intended when ISPs are merely the medium through which millions of third-
parties post messages.151  For example, in Zeran v. AOL § 230 properly immunized AOL for a 
defamatory message posted on one of its bulletin boards.152  The Zeran court refused to hold 
AOL liable because it would be impossible for the ISP to monitor and control the millions of 
messages that were posted daily through the service.153  Most courts and scholars agree that § 
230 immunity makes perfect sense in this context given (1) the near impossible task that ISPs 
would have to face in monitoring and controlling the millions of messages posted through its 
                                                 
149 David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act Upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 61 ALB. L. REV. 147, 179 (1997) 
(“[C]onstruing § 230 to immunize interactive services from distributor liability creates an 
asymmetry between electronic and print media that is difficult to justify.”). 
150 Waldman, supra note 27, at 33 (“[T]raditional defamation law imputes liability based upon 
the nature of the party defamed and the editorial control retained by the particular defendant.”).  
See Brian C. McManus, Note, Rethinking Defamation Liability for Internet Service Providers, 35 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 647, 668 (2001) (“Unfortunately, when courts began to consider cyber-
defamation cases they examined the ISP as an entity instead of isolating the particular function 
of the ISP that gave rise to the litigation.”). 
151 See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 163 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (“In some contexts – 
such as e-mail – service providers are not only unaware of the nature of the information they 
distribute but, as a practical matter, cannot control transmissions.”), rev’d, 51 Cal. Rptr.3d 55 
(Cal. 2006). 
152 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
153 Id. at 331; see also Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1039 (9th Cir. 2003) (Gould, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting that it would be impossible for an ISP to screen 
emails, chat rooms and bulletin boards). 
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servers daily,154 and (2) the lack of editorial contribution and control the ISP exerts in these 
situations.155 
Section 230’s immunity, however, is simply too broad and makes little sense when 
applied to other situations.  Blumenthal v. Drudge is a clear example of the injustice that § 230 
works.156  There, the court held that AOL was not liable for defamatory material published 
through its service, even though AOL paid the author for the rights to his column and actively 
publicized his column to attract new subscribers.157  The Blumenthal court explicitly stated in its 
opinion that it would have applied the common law framework to AOL given the amount of 
control it reserved, but could not do so because of § 230’s immunity.158  In situations such as that 
in Blumenthal, there is no reason that ISPs and website operators should not be held accountable 
for the defamatory content they actively select and publish, and, in Blumenthal’s case, even 
publicize. 
As a result, the common law framework would best serve the special circumstances that 
the Internet provides without totally precluding recovery for defamation against ISPs and website 
operators, as § 230 currently does.  Different standards for liability would apply based on the 
                                                 
154 See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1039 (“Congress understood that entities that facilitate communication 
on the Internet – particularly entitles that operate e-mail networks, ‘chat rooms,’ ‘bulletin 
boards,’ and ‘listservs’ – have special needs. . . . It would be impossible to screen all such 
communications . . . .”). 
155 See, e.g., id. at 1038 (“We should hold that the CDA immunizes a defendant only when the 
defendant took no active role in selecting the questionable information for publication.”); see 
also Waldman, supra note 27, at 66 (suggesting that ISPs should incur liability when they have 
substantively edited the defamatory material, but should not incur liability for “minor editing, 
existence as a mere conduit, or electronic-filtering activities”). 
156 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998). 
157 Id. at 47. 
158 Id. at 51–52. 
 23
amount of control and knowledge an ISP retained.159  An entity that performed traditional 
editorial duties such as deciding whether and what to publish, and that had the ability to make 
changes, would be liable for defamatory messages by a third-party author, as long as the plaintiff 
can show negligence on the part of the ISP.160  This approach makes the most sense in a situation 
like that in Blumenthal, where the ISP knows precisely what it is publishing and also has the 
ability to alter its content.161 
On the other hand, a common carrier that is merely a passive medium through which 
third-parties send messages would not be liable under any circumstances.162  As stated above, it 
is simply infeasible to require ISPs to monitor the millions of messages sent daily through email, 
bulletin boards and chat rooms for defamatory content.163  Immunity makes sense in this 
situation because the Internet has very different communicative characteristics than traditional 
forms of media.164  As a result, ISPs and website operators would not be liable in these situations 
and could avoid the near-impossible task of screening such content.  While continued immunity 
in this context would not help an individual who was defamed through a bulletin board, it is 
proper, and arguably necessary, to retain § 230 immunity in these areas of Internet publication. 
                                                 
159 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc., v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1995) (noting that Prodigy opened itself up to greater liability than other ISPs because it chose to 
exert editorial control over the materials that contained defamatory content). 
160  See Zitter, 84 A.L.R. 5TH 169, § 2[a] (2000); Waldman, supra note 27, at 54 (“[An ISP] 
should be held accountable where it takes the role of actively editing, either by adding additional 
text or by editing for length and content.”). 
161 See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1039 (Gould, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“[A] person 
who receives a libelous communication and makes the decision to disseminate that message to 
others . . . would not be immune.”). 
162 Id. 
163 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
164 See, e.g., Lunney, v. Prodigy Services Co., 94 N.Y.2d 242, 249 (N.Y. 1999) (“Prodigy’s role 
in transmitting e-mail is akin to that of a telephone company, which one neither wants nor 
expects to superintend the content of its subscribers’ conversations.  In this respect, an ISP, like a 
telephone company, is merely a conduit.”). 
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In the middle of the spectrum are those entities that are considered distributors.  For these 
entities that do not retain much editorial control over the materials they distribute, but do select 
what they will and will not distribute, a knowledge-based liability applies.165  This standard of 
control would apply to situations that resemble the circumstances in Batzel v. Smith, where an 
ISP decided what to publish on its website and through its listserv, but did not exert much 
editorial control over the material.166  This standard of liability, according to scholars and critics, 
would be fair as applied to ISPs given the way they often operate.167  Under this level of liability, 
an ISP would need to address potentially defamatory content if it received notice of such content. 
Two concerns are commonly raised regarding notice-based liability for ISPs and website 
operators that, in the specific function they are performing, would be classified as distributors 
under the common law framework.  First, some courts and scholars worry that this type of 
notice-based liability for entities classified as distributors will encourage those entities to ignore 
the content that is posted through their websites to avoid having the required notice.168  The 
thrust of this argument is that “[a]ny efforts by a service provider to investigate and screen 
material posted on its service would only lead to notice of potentially defamatory material more 
frequently and thereby create a stronger basis for liability.”169  However, with the blanket 
immunity § 230 provides, Congress has simply assumed that if it immunizes ISPs and website 
operators from liability, then those entities will screen content for defamatory material out of 
                                                 
165 Zitter, 84 A.L.R. 5TH 169, § 2[a]; but see Waldman, supra note 27, at 54 (noting that when an 
ISP merely decides whether to publish or remove content it should retain immunity). 
166 See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1018. 
167 See, e.g., Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The Case of 
Intermediary Liability for Defamation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 569, 617 (2001). 
168 Zeran, v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Barrett, v. 
Rosenthal, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 55, 73 (Cal. 2006) (noting that the notice-based “aspect of distributor 
liability would discourage active monitoring of Internet postings” and such would “frustrate the 
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169 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333. 
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their own senses of altruism.  It is counterproductive to attempt to encourage these entities to 
self-regulate their content for defamatory speech by immunizing them for that defamatory speech 
regardless of whether the ISP attempts whatsoever to be responsible and screen its content.170  
While we would like to think that ISPs will screen their own content out of the goodness of their 
corporate hearts, it is a risk that Congress has chosen to take without any evidence.  With this 
choice, Congress has put its faith in ISPs to self-regulate and has cut off individuals’ ability to 
seek redress, regardless of whether those ISPs regulate their content. 
A better solution is to enforce self-regulation by imposing stricter standards on ISPs and 
website operators.  In particular, the law could be changed to account for when an ISP 
reasonably should or should not have notice.  Under this standard, an ISP could not simply evade 
distributor liability by ignoring the content on its website if a reasonable ISP under the same 
circumstances would have had notice.  This objective “reasonable ISP” standard would continue 
to preclude liability for those entities which, under the circumstances, were not required to know, 
nor could reasonably have known, of the defamatory content.171  On the other hand, under this 
standard, those ISPs which reasonably should have known of the defamatory content – given 
what a reasonable ISP or website operator under the circumstances would have known – cannot 
avoid liability by simply turning away from its duties of being cognizant of the content flowing 
through its website.  This added feature to the common law framework would address the 
                                                 
170 Barrett, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 70 (“[T]he immunity conferred by section 230 applies even when 
self-regulation is unsuccessful, or completely unattempted.”). 
171 This would likely apply to an ISP that has bulletin boards and email as part of its network.  
For an entity such as this, a reasonable ISP would almost surely not be expected to screen that 
kind of content due to its quantity.  Thus, an ISP who failed to screen content such as this would 
not be unreasonable and would still likely avoid liability under the common law framework. 
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concern that notice-based liability will encourage ISPs to close their eyes to possibly defamatory 
content out of fear that they will incur liability once they have notice of it.172 
Second, proponents and supporters of § 230 fear that a notice-based liability scheme will 
have “a chilling effect on the freedom of Internet speech.”173  They fear that “[b]ecause service 
providers would be subject to liability only for the publication of information, and not for its 
removal, they would have a natural incentive simply to remove messages upon notification, 
whether the contents were defamatory or not.”174  The conclusion one must draw given this view 
is that Congress would rather promote speech on the Internet than have ISPs and website 
operators be cautious about potentially defamatory speech.  While free speech is undoubtedly a 
matter of great public interest and should be protected, Congress should not ignore the 
compelling competing interest when considering this issue: individuals’ interest in not being 
defamed.175 
The first response to this concern about potential defamation liability is that ISPs and 
website operators are for-profit businesses, and if they screen too much material they will 
quickly lose their edge in the Internet marketplace.  As courts and scholars have stated, ISPs are 
incentivized not to over-screen messages because word travels fast, and “a service that removes 
members’ postings without any investigation is likely to get a bad reputation in a community 
                                                 
172 E.g., Friedman & Buono, supra note 148, at 663 (noting that the threat of litigation might 
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whose first value is the free flow of information.”176  This consequence of overly-aggressive 
content screening – the “marketplace force,” let’s call it – will force ISPs and website operators 
to take a closer look at potentially defamatory content before simply removing it because of its 
possibly defamatory nature. 
Another response to Congress’s and some critics’ concern that potential liability will chill 
Internet speech is that there is a reason that an individual or entity can be liable for defamation: 
“free speech is not an absolute right.”177  Defamation law is premised on the idea that an 
individual can be liable for damages if he defames another person, even though he generally has 
First Amendment free speech rights.178  However, Congress seemingly ignored the individuals’ 
interest in not being defamed when enacting § 230.179  Thus, the short answer to the fear that 
potential liability for ISPs might chill or stunt online speech is that not all speech is supposed to 
go unregulated.  There is a reason why defamation law exists and it is because there are limits to 
individuals’ right to free speech when other interests, like an individual’s interest in his 
reputation, are involved.180  Applying a modified common law framework, though, would 
continue to serve Congress’s and society’s interest in promoting speech on the Internet, while not 
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completely ignoring individuals’ interest in not being defamed.  Defamatory speech that injures 
other individuals’ reputations is precisely the type of speech that should be chilled.  Such speech 
should not go unpunished on the Internet – as it currently does under § 230 – solely because 
Congress is concerned that some non-defamatory speech will be screened in the process. 
Furthermore, defamation law could actually benefit Internet discourse.181  Not only does 
defamation law reflect society’s interest in protecting individuals’ dignity, it helps to make 
meaningful public discourse possible by exposing the speech that crosses certain boundaries of 
decency.182  Potential defamation liability may actually promote speech on the Internet because 
the fear of being verbally attacked without the opportunity for redress is a disincentive for people 
to speak their minds on the Internet.183  Individuals may choose to keep quiet rather than 
speaking their minds through the Internet because they know that if they are subsequently 
attacked through speech on the Internet, they will be unable to recover damages from the ISP or 
website operator.  Also, if there is the potential for defamation liability, Internet speech will be 
more focused and less irrational.  As one scholar has noted, “[t]he quality of speech is improved 
when speakers realize that their speech has consequences.”184  Thus, potential publisher and 
distributor liability for defamation on the Internet has the potential to actually increase the 
quality and amount of speech, rather than chill it. 
Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that ISPs and website operators profit greatly 
from their online services.  On that basis alone, some scholars argue, these entities should be 
held at least somewhat accountable for their actions, given that there are victims of defamation 
out there whose reputations and lives are seriously impaired as a result of defamatory material 
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published on the Internet.185  A variety of things in the law are influenced by whether someone is 
profiting financially from the endeavor at issue,186 and the same should follow for ISPs who 
publish defamatory content through their servers and are not held accountable.  
Lastly, in many cases the victim of online defamation cannot identify the original author 
and is left without recourse because the ISP is immune.187  This anonymity itself does not justify 
holding ISPs liable, but the Internet provides the ability to disseminate material anonymously 
and the law should take that into account.  A newspaper, on the other hand, knows precisely who 
its contributing authors are, and so a defamation victim would at least know from whom to seek 
redress if the newspaper itself was not liable.  Because the Internet provides unique situations 
where an individual can anonymously post defamatory content, there is even more reason why 
the ISP or website operator should not be immunized from potential liability if it met the 
standard of knowledge or control that would justify imposing liability on it. 
In sum, the CDA should be repealed and courts should apply the common law framework 
to ISPs to determine publisher liability.  This approach would restrict immunity for ISPs to only 
those situations where an ISP warrants immunity, such as for claims based on emails or the 
posting of messages in bulletin boards or chat rooms.  On the other hand, this approach would 
allow liability in situations where ISPs have editorial control over what they publish, thus 
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eliminating the free pass those entities currently enjoy.188  Also, regarding the fear of Congress, 
some courts and scholars that a notice-based liability for those entities that fall into the middle 
“distributor” category will encourage no self-regulation, the law should be reworked to include a 
reasonable ISP standard.  This standard will ensure that ISPs self-regulate because if an ISP fails 
to self-regulate for the purpose of avoiding notice, but a reasonable ISP in the same 
circumstances would have reviewed that content, the ISP will subject itself to possible liability.  
Furthermore, Congress’s fear that potential liability will encourage ISPs to remove too much 
potentially defamatory content and thus chill Internet speech is not without counterargument.  
First, ISPs will inherently be cautious about screening too much material because, if they do, the 
word will spread that they are over-screening and their popularity will shrink.  Second, the type 
of speech that would be screened – potentially defamatory speech – is of a type that should be 
screened.  Individuals’ rights in the sanctity of their reputations outweigh individuals’ right to 
free speech in some circumstances, which is why defamation law exists in the first place.   
The Internet allows for cheap, fast and far-reaching dissemination of defamatory material 
and thus facilitates online defamation and the damage it causes.189  As a result, it is simply unjust 
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B. Courts Should Apply the Common Law Framework on a Case-by-Case Basis 
 
In this new approach to Internet defamation liability using the three-part common law 
framework, courts should apply the framework on a case-by-case basis.  In the early Internet 
defamation cases, courts examined all of a given ISP’s functions rather than singling out the 
particular function at issue in the case.190  It is difficult for courts to apply this approach with 
today’s Internet because most ISPs and website operators perform a variety of functions.191  For 
example, AOL still operates chat rooms and acts as a server for email communication, but it also 
posts articles and acts like a newspaper in that regard. 
Determining the proper standard of liability based on what an ISP or website operator is 
doing in that particular instance will ensure that liability correlates with editorial control and 
knowledge.192  For instance, in cases where an ISP or website operator acts like a publisher, such 
as when it publishes an online newspaper article, it should be held to the same standard of 
liability as a print newspaper.193  On the other hand, that same ISP or website operator would 
only be held to the standard of liability for a common carrier if the defamation arose out of an 
email sent by third parties through the ISP’s server.194  This would directly address one of the 
critics’ main concerns over stripping § 230 immunity and applying the common law framework: 
the unreasonableness inherent in requiring ISPs to screen for defamatory content the millions of 
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messages and posts they host everyday.195  Indeed, this approach would almost surely not lead to 
liability for an ISP that simply allows third-party messages to pass through its servers.196  But it 
could, on the other hand (and justifiably so), subject to liability an ISP that has an active role in 
selecting, approving and editing content it publishes.197 
This approach would further most of the pertinent public policy goals.198  Particularly, 
this approach would further the goal of not unreasonably forcing ISPs and website operators to 
face liability for all of the functions they serve, while also serving the goal of recognizing 
individuals’ interest in being redressed when their reputation is tarnished.  Indeed, this approach 
would continue to preclude liability for those ISPs that do not retain enough editorial control or 
knowledge to screen material, but at the same time it would provide defamed individuals a 
source of recovery in those circumstances when an ISP or website operator should be held 
accountable for their actions due to the extent of their involvement in publishing the defamatory 
content. 
Also, such an approach would alleviate scholars’ concern that the common law categories 
cannot properly apply to ISPs because of the differing amounts of control they assert over the 
various functions they perform.199  It logically follows that an ISP should not be immune from 
liability for all of its functions when some of those functions involve editorial control or 
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knowledge of defamatory material.200  Under this approach, an ISP will not be automatically 
placed into one common law category, but rather will be characterized as a publisher, distributor 
or common carrier based on what function it is performing in the particular circumstance. 
 
C. The Immunity Courts Read into § 230 was Broader than Congress Intended, and 
Congress’s Objectives of Internet Growth Have Been Met and Surpassed 
 
The immunity § 230 currently provides as interpreted by the courts could not have been 
what Congress intended.201  Even if Congress did intend to grant such broad immunity to ISPs to 
encourage the growth and prosperity of the Internet, such immunity is not necessary anymore 
since the Internet has become such an enormous medium.202 
It is likely that Congress’s intention when enacting § 230 was to provide a safeguard for 
ISPs due to the types of new communications that the Internet created.203  Specifically, the 
Internet brought about types of communication such as email, chat rooms, bulletin boards and 
listservs.  These forms of communication are unique to the Internet and allow for such a free 
flow of communication between third-parties that screening them for defamatory material would 
                                                 
200 See id. (stating that because ISPs have control in some of its functions they should not be 
characterized as common carriers and thus immune from liability). 
201 See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 154 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (“The view of most 
scholars who have addressed the issue is that . . . the [Zeran] court ascribed to Congress an intent 
to create a far broader immunity than that body actually had in mind or is necessary to achieve its 
purposes.”), rev’d, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 55 (Cal. 2006). 
202 See infra notes 214–217 and accompanying text. 
203 See Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 538 (E.D. Va. 2003) (noting that 
Congress’s aim in providing immunity was a result of the “‘staggering’ amount of content” that 
passes through ISPs); see also Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(stating that Congress’s purpose in enacting § 230 was to deal with the problem that millions of 
AOL users post messages daily and it would be impossible for AOL to screen all such 
messages). 
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be all but impossible.204  With the millions of communications passing through these channels 
everyday, the threat of tort liability in this area would have a chilling effect on free speech.205  
Possibly even more important to Congress at the time was the fear that the threat of tort liability 
would stunt the growth of the Internet.206  Thus, it is likely that Congress enacted § 230 and 
changed the standards for defamation liability for ISPs due to the unique circumstances the 
Internet provides. 
If this was Congress’s intent, though, the Zeran court quickly misinterpreted it and 
changed it forever.207  In Zeran, the Fourth Circuit interpreted § 230 to immunize ISPs not only 
for defamatory material posted on its websites through message boards and chat rooms, but also 
for functions that were much more like their print counterparts, such as publication decisions.208  
This interpretation seems to acknowledge Congress’s concern over the new types of technologies 
made available by the Internet, but also extends the same immunity to these other situations 
                                                 
204 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1039 (9th Cir. 2003) (Gould, J., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part).  Congress’s reasoning behind § 230 is evidenced by the statements by Representatives 
who proposed the bill to the House: 
There is no way that any of those entities, like Prodigy, can take the 
responsibility to edit out information that is going to be coming in to them 
from all manner of sources onto their bulletin board. We are talking about 
something that is far larger than our daily newspaper. We are talking about 
something that is going to be thousands of pages of information every day, 
and to have that imposition imposed on them is wrong. 
Barrett, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 70 n.15 (citing 141 Cong. Rec. H8471-H8472 (statement of Rep. 
Goodlatte)). 
205 Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1039. 
206 Id. 
207 But see Freiwald, supra note 167, at 640 (noting that it was Congress’s intent to so broadly 
immunize ISPs and the Zeran court was simply executing policy). 
208 129 F.3d at 330.  
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where immunity does not make sense.  Indeed, the Zeran court, according to courts and scholars, 
seriously overextended the immunity Congress intended to grant to ISPs.209 
It is unlikely that Congress intended to immunize ISPs and website operators for 
performing the same functions as their print counterparts.  At the time Congress enacted § 230, 
the Internet was a relatively new, developing technology and was very limited in its content.  
Providing online encyclopedias, dictionaries, bulletin boards and chat rooms were some of the 
small number of functions the Internet performed at the time.  Indeed, at the time Congress 
enacted § 230 it is unlikely that it knew that within a few years almost every newspaper and print 
medium would have a website publishing the same material.   
Extending § 230’s immunity to a situation like that in Blumenthal v. Drudge exemplifies 
this problem.210  In Blumenthal, the situation did not involve defamation arising from one of 
several thousand third party posts that AOL could not be reasonably expected to screen for 
defamatory material.  Rather, the defamatory content stemmed from an article by a columnist 
with whom AOL contracted to have on its site, advertised for, and had the right to edit.211  
Congress could not have intended to immunize an ISP that had this level of knowledge of the 
material it published and the amount of editorial control it had over such material.  There is 
simply no reason that ISPs who exert this type of editorial control and have such knowledge of 
the content they are publishing should be immune from possible defamation liability that results.  
                                                 
209 Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr.3d 142, 154 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (“The view of most 
scholars who have addressed the issue is that Zeran’s analysis of section 230 is flawed, in that 
the court ascribed to Congress an intent to create a far broader immunity than that body actually 
had in mind or is necessary to achieve its purposes.”), rev’d, 51 Cal. Rptr.3d 55 (Cal. 2006). 
210 See supra notes 84–97 and accompanying text. 
211 Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 47 (D.D.C. 1998). 
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Indeed, as scholars and critics alike have stated, “court decisions interpreting subsection 230(c) 
have broadened its ambit far beyond merely protecting ‘Good Samaritan’ editorial control.”212 
Congress wanted to promote the growth of the Internet and make sure that government 
regulation did not harm that goal.  However, Congress could not have intended its law to create 
such broad immunity that people are left with little chance to recover if they are defamed through 
the Internet.213 
Moreover, even if Congress did intend such broad immunity, the Internet’s growth over 
the last decade has mooted those goals.  One of Congress’s main objectives when enacting § 230 
was to promote the growth and development of the Internet.214  Even at the time Congress 
enacted § 230 some scholars doubted whether such immunity was necessary for the growth of 
the Internet.215  Today, though, with the Internet being the giant medium that it is, there is no 
doubt that Congress’s original goal of promoting the growth of the Internet has been met and is 
no longer a concern.216  The Internet has become such an important part of our society and our 
everyday life that there is no doubt that it will continue to grow and flourish as Congress desired.  
There is and will continue to be extensive competition and business interest in the Internet so 
that, even with stricter laws and potential defamation liability for ISPs and website operators, 
companies and individuals will continue to develop the Internet. 
                                                 
212 Lidsky, supra note 173, at 871. 
213 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003) (Gould, J., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part) (“Congress did not want this new frontier to be like the Old West:  a lawless zone 
governed by retribution and mob justice.  The CDA does not license anarchy.”). 
214 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1) (2000); Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1037 (Gould, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part) (stating that when Congress enacted § 230, it was “worried that excessive 
state-law libel lawsuits would threaten the growth of the Internet”). 
215 Sheridan, supra note 149, at 179 (noting in 1997 that “it is not at all clear that additional 
protection is necessary for [ISPs] to grow and flourish”). 
216 Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability, 47 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 239, 306 (2005). 
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Indeed, ISPs and website operators should no longer be able to benefit from an outdated 
law that was meant to promote the growth of the Internet.  The nature of the Internet has changed 
drastically since Congress enacted § 230 and yet the law has remained idle.  Consequently, the 
law needs to adapt to the current circumstances of the Internet and enforce accountability on 
ISPs and website operators when they either retain control over the material they publish or have 
knowledge of its contents.217  Congress’s fear that the Internet will suffer as a result of this 
potential liability will be eased because the Internet has changed the way we live, it is here to 
stay, and the competition for Internet marketplace supremacy will assure that potential liability 
does not stunt the Internet’s growth. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
In sum, § 230 of the CDA needs to be amended or repealed.218  The current problem is 
that ISPs and website operators have near blanket immunity for defamation stemming from the 
materials they publish.219  A better approach is to allow courts to apply the three-part common 
law framework.220  Using the common law framework will properly provide differing standards 
of liability for ISPs and website operators based on the amount of editorial control they have 
over, or their knowledge of, the defamatory material they publish or otherwise make available.221  
The law should also change to include a “reasonable ISP” standard that asks whether an ISP 
should have had notice of defamatory content, rather than simply whether it actually knew of the 
                                                 
217 See Sheridan, supra note 149, at 179 (stating that lawmakers should carefully reconsider 
Congress’s early policy that ISPs should not have any liability for defamatory material published 
through the Internet). 
218 See supra Part IV. 
219 See supra Part IV. 
220 See supra Part IV.A. 
221 See supra Part IV.A. 
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content.222  This approach will take into account critics’ concern that ISPs will simply ignore 
potentially defamatory speech as a way to avoid notice and thus avoid potential liability.223  It 
also addresses critics’ concern that potential defamation liability will chill online speech because 
a) as we know from defamation law generally, not all speech is supposed to be free and 
unregulated, and b) on the contrary, if individuals know that they can successfully seek redress 
for retaliatory defamation they will be more likely to speak their minds freely on the Internet.224  
Finally, courts should apply the common law framework on a case-by-case basis, placing an ISP 
into a category – publisher, distributor, common carrier – based on the specific function it was 
performing at the time.225   
This approach will properly take into account Congress’s concern about ISPs having to 
police millions of messages posted by third parties, while also addressing society’s interest in 
redressing those defamed through the Internet.226  Additionally, it will carry out the proper 
amount of liability that Congress intended, rather than the overly broad immunity the courts have 
read into § 230.227  Lastly, using this approach and repealing § 230 is especially sensible given 
the growth and development of the Internet in the last decade.228  Indeed, Congress and society 
as a whole can rest easy knowing that the Internet is a booming business with many interested 
investors, and it will not be stunted due to the imposition of potential liability for publishers and 
distributors of defamatory material. 
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